In a big win for telecommunications companies and other online service providers, the Supreme Court ruled on March 25, 2026 that Cox Communications, Inc. (“Cox”) does not have secondary liability for copyright infringement committed by users of Cox’s network.[1] The Court overturned the Fourth Circuit’s holding, rejecting the premise that an internet service provider can have contributory liability for copyright infringement simply because the service provider continued to provide service even after the user has received multiple notices of copyright infringement.[2] The Justices underscored that the Copyright Act does not establish special rules for holding a service provider contributorily liable for the infringement of its subscribers, and declined to address the separate doctrine of vicarious liability, which had already been rejected by the Fourth Circuit on appeal.[3]
Background:
In the underlying case, the jury found Cox liable to Sony Music Entertainment and the other plaintiffs[4] (collectively “Sony”) for vicarious and contributory copyright infringement due to repeat, direct infringer subscribers using Cox’s network to illegally download plaintiffs’ music where Cox, despite knowledge of the infringement, failed to terminate the subscriber.[5] The jury awarded Sony $1B.[6] On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the jury’s finding of vicarious liability was not viable as a matter of law, but confirmed the finding of contributory liability and sent the case back to the district court to reconsider damages in light of the modified ruling on liability.
The Court granted certiorari solely on the question of whether or not Cox could be held contributorily liable for the infringement committed by its subscribers under the facts presented. The majority announced a clear rule: a service provider is contributorily liable only if it intended its service to be used for infringement. Intent can be shown only when the service provider either induced infringement, or offered a service specifically designed to facilitate infringement.[7] On the facts before it, the Court found neither, and specifically held that failing to terminate a subscriber who it knows continues to commit infringement is not sufficient to establish contributory liability. Cox did not “induce” or “encourage” infringement, and its internet service remained “capable of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing uses.”[8] That framing has implications far beyond the broadband context. The Court’s opinion makes it materially harder to convert notice-heavy evidence into secondary-liability exposure where the defendant offers a lawful, general-purpose service to the public.[9]
The decision also confirmed an important background question about the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) and its application to the claims at issue. Plaintiff argued that the DMCA supported its theory of liability inasmuch as the DMCA removes the safe harbor protection to a service provider where it knowingly allows infringement to continue on its platform. The Court held the opposite. The Court clarified that just because Cox may not qualify for a DMCA safe harbor defense does not mean that the DMCA safe harbor provision establishes liability. Addressing Sony’s argument that the DMCA safe harbor would be meaningless unless providers could otherwise be held liable for continuing to serve known infringers,[10] the Court rejected that premise, explaining that the DMCA does not itself impose liability and instead “merely creates new defenses from liability,” while 17 U.S.C. § 512(l) confirms that failure to qualify for safe harbor does not count against a provider’s separate defense that its conduct is not infringing.[11]
The concurrence, however, is a warning label for anyone tempted to read the decision too broadly. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, agreed that Cox should prevail under the facts presented, but argued that the majority went too far in limiting contributory liability to only the two theories identified.[12] In her view, common-law aiding-and-abetting principles may still remain available to establish secondary liability in copyright infringement cases.[13] Even so, Justice Jackson concluded that Sony would still lose on this record because the notices identified a connection, not a person: “That informational gap is fatal here.” [14] For future litigants, that may prove to be the most practical lesson of the case. Generalized knowledge that infringement is happening somewhere on a network is one thing; proof tying a defendant to specific infringers or specific unlawful acts is another.
The immediate takeaway from this opinion is that suing an intermediary now requires stronger evidence. Plaintiffs must show intentionally inducement to infringe, or providing a product or service designed specifically to facilitate infringement without other non-infringing uses. Providers of general‑purpose digital services will rely on Cox whenever the claim is simply that they knew infringement was happening and did not do enough to stop it. For rights holders, the burden remains to enforce against direct infringers, cumbersome as that may be, and so, the whack‑a‑mole saga rolls on. The Cox decision confirms that you will get further chasing the pirate than yelling at the pipe he used to get online.
Dinsmore will continue tracking developments in this area and is ready to help clients evaluate how Cox may affect current enforcement strategies or future claims.
[1] Cox Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sony Music Ent., No. 24-171, 2026 LX 183443, at 17 (Mar. 25, 2026).
[2] Id.
[3] Id. at 15.; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).
[4] The other plaintiffs include Sony Music Entertainment US Latin LLC; Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC; Arista Records, LLC; Arista Music; Warner Bros. Records, Inc.; Warner Records, Inc. (formerly W.B.M. Music Corp.); Warner/Chappell Music, Inc.; Warner‑Tamerlane Publishing Corporation; W.B.M. Music Corp.; W.C.M. Music Corp.; UMG Recordings, Inc.; Universal Music Corporation; Universal Music‑MGB NA LLC; Universal Music Publishing Inc.; Universal Music Publishing AB; Universal Publishing Limited; Universal Music Publishing MGB Limited; Universal Music – Z Tunes LLC; Universal/MCA Music Publishing Pty. Limited; Universal/Island Music Limited; EMI April Music Inc.; EMI Algee Music Corp.; EMI Feist Catalog Inc.; EMI Blackwood Music Inc.; EMI Mills Music, Inc.; EMI Miller Catalog Inc.; EMI Unart Catalog Inc.; EMI U Catalog Inc.; EMI Consortium Music Publishing Inc. (doing business as EMI Full Keel Music); EMI Consortium Songs, Inc. (doing business as EMI Longitude Music); Colgems‑EMI Music Inc.; EMI AI Gallico Music Corp.; Polygram Publishing, Inc.; Universal‑Songs of Polygram International, Inc.; Universal Polygram International Publishing, Inc.; Universal‑Polygram International Tunes, Inc.; Rondor Music International; Atlantic Recording Corporation; Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc.; Fueled by Ramen LLC; Roadrunner Records, Inc.; Cotillion Music, Incorporated; Rightsong Music Inc.; Songs of Universal, Inc.; InterSong U.S.A., Inc.; Jobete Music Company, Incorporated; Stone Agate Music; Screen Gems‑EMI Music, Incorporated; Stone Diamond Music Corp.; Volcano Entertainment III, LLC; Capitol Records, LLC; LaFace Records LLC; Zomba Recordings LLC; Provident Label Group, LLC; Nonesuch Records Inc.; and Music Corporation of America, Inc. (doing business as Universal Music Corporation).
[5] Entertainment v. Cox Communs., Inc., 93 F.4th 222, 227 (4th Cir. 2024).
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 7-8.
[8] Id. at 16.
[9] Id.; Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930, 939 n.12; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439, 456 (1984).
[10] Id. at 17.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 18.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 31(citing Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280, 294–97 (2025)).